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The insights of choice architecture have led to expanded use of default settings in defined 
contribution (DC) plans in both the United States and Australia.  The two countries have 
taken somewhat similar approaches to the content of default investment products.  
However, they differ significantly in how they allocate the legal responsibilities 
associated with those default investment products. This paper compares the two 
approaches, particularly regarding the role of disclosure and the assignment of fiduciary 
responsibility.  It concludes that Australia’s approach offers two lessons for the U.S.  
First, disclosure to and education of participants who are defaulted into investment 
products is inadequate to negate conflicts of interest and investment risk.  Second, 
fiduciary responsibility for default investment products should be co-located with 
investment expertise and management.  The paper suggests development of a new 
investment product, Safe Harbor Automated Retirement Products (SHARPs), based on 
these lessons.     
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“On January 1, 2011, the oldest Baby Boomers [turned] 65. Every day for the next 19 
years, about 10,000 more will cross that threshold. By 2030, when all Baby Boomers will 






Long-term wealth creation and retirement security for the much discussed 
“ninety-nine percent”
2
 depends in large part on employer-sponsored plans that enable 
employees to save for their retirement.  For many employees their retirement-related 
savings accounts are their single largest asset – or their second largest asset after their 
home.
3
  Currently Americans hold more than $3.4 trillion
4
 in their 401(k) plans.
5
  For 
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 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Making Sure “The Buck Stops Here”: Barring Executives 
for Corporate Violations, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 91 (2012) (“The movement called 
‘Occupy Wall Street’ has sought to take over locations in New York City and elsewhere 
to protest what it sees as corporate greed and corruption that have led to a growing 
inequality between powerful moneyed interests and ‘the other 99 percent’”). 
3
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perspective, that is the equivalent of 28 percent of the domestic equity market 
capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange.
6
  
Yet, in spite of the trillions of dollars held in these accounts, problems with 
401(k) plans are apparent.  Most scholars and policymakers agree that too few employees 
participate in those plans, when employees do participate they save too little money, and 
their decisions on how to invest their account assets tend to be problematic.
7
  Research in 
behavioral economics explains cognitive biases that lead to flawed decision making.
8
  
The principles of choice architecture have contributed to statutory reforms and voluntary 
changes by some employers to the structure of their 401(k) plans.
9
  Yet, large sectors of 




The severity of the issues with the current system and the potential contributions 
of choice architecture have not gone unnoticed. There have been many thoughtful and 
creative proposals for reform of the employer-based retirement security system.  Some 
have focused primarily on tax incentives.
11
  Others have discussed ways of salvaging the 
traditional pension plans that increasingly have been replaced or supplemented by 401(k) 
plans.
12
  Other approaches favor increased government intervention and paternalism; for 
example one commentator has proposed the creation of a system of Guaranteed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5
 401(k) plans are a type of defined contribution (DC) plan.  For an explanation of DC 
plans and how they differ from defined benefit (DB) plans, see infra text accompanying 
notes 36-38, 152-55. Many of the concepts discussed in this article could be extended to 
other types of defined contribution plans including those sponsored by governmental 
entities.  For purposes of scope, I focus the discussion here on 401(k) plans.  
6
 World Federation of Exchanges, 2011 WFE Market Highlights, 6 (2012) (reporting 
New York Stock Exchange capitalization of almost $12 million), .   
7
 See infra text accompanying notes 267-71. 
8
 See infra text accompanying notes 27-31. 
9
 See infra text accompanying notes 55-56, 59-61. 
10
 See infra text accompanying notes 44-48, 267-68.  
11
 See, e.g., Colleen E. Medill, Targeted Pension Reform, 27 J. LEGIS. 1, 3 (2001) 
(proposing closure of loopholes in the tax system that result in benefits being lower than 
they otherwise would be for lower wage workers); Michael W. Melton, Making the 
Nondiscrimination Rules of Tax-Qualified Retirement Plans More Effective 71 B.U.L. 
REV. 47, 50 (1991) (arguing that tax incentives are not sufficient to induce low-income 
workers to save for retirement); see also Paul M. Secunda, 401K Follies:  A Proposal to 
Reinvigorate the United States Annuity Market, 30 ABA SEC. TAX’N NEWS Q., 13, 14-15 
(2010) (arguing for tax law changes to require 401(k) plans to offer annuitized 
distribution options). 
12
 See, e.g., Michael J. Collins, Reviving Defined Benefit Plans:  Analysis and 
Suggestions for Reform, 20 VA. TAX REV. 599, 602 (2001) (advocating simplification of 
the tax laws governing defined benefit plans in order to encourage plan sponsorship); 
Barry Kozak, The Cash Balance Plan:  An Integral Component of the Defined Benefit 
Plan Renaissance, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 753, 800-04 (2004) (arguing that cash 
balance plans could ensure reliable lifetime income for retirees and reduce employer 
risk). 




Retirement Accounts, including mandatory contributions for all employees with 
investment of the assets to be determined by a government-appointed group of trustees.
13
  
Another somewhat similar proposal would eliminate the 401(k) system, provide 
government matching contributions to accounts for low-and-middle income wage 
earners, and delegate investment authority to a government-selected fund manager.
14
  
Senator Tom Harkin advocates a system that would require all employers to make 
contributions to a plan for employees, who also might contribute, with the assets to be 
managed on a conservative basis by private-sector funds.
15
   
Here I advocate incremental reform of the current 401(k) system with a continued 
emphasis on voluntary employer sponsorship and employee choice.  This proposal is 
unique in that it builds upon the contributions that choice architecture theory has made to 
our knowledge of 401(k) plan structure and the use of default settings while retaining the 
ideological differentiation between the private-employer based pension system and Social 
Security.  The proposal reflects this Article’s analysis that the locus of fiduciary 
responsibility in 401(k) plans has become disconnected from its trust law origins.  
Adoption of the proposal would encourage more employees to sponsor 401(k) plans and 
result in more employees contributing to those plans.
16
 In addition, more assets should be 
held in low cost, appropriately diversified investment vehicles. The reform proposal is 
counter-intuitive, though on its face not entirely novel:
17
  I argue that portions of the 
fiduciary responsibility currently shouldered by employers that sponsor 401(k) plans 
should be shifted to financial services providers.  And small employers should have the 
ability to entirely avoid fiduciary responsibility for 401(k) investment selection and plan 
administration.   
This article proceeds as follows.  In Part II, I explore the lessons of choice 
architecture and behavioral economics for the allocation of decision making in 401(k) 
plans, beginning with some background on the economic theory.  After a brief discussion 
of the allocation of the plan sponsorship decision, the next subsections turn to employee 
contributions and investment selection.  When viewed through a purely regulatory lens, 
those decisions are entirely in the hands of employees. Behavioral economics research, 
however, shows that employer decisions on plan terms may significantly affect employee 
decision making.  As a result of that research, some employers have adopted plan default 
settings intended to ‘nudge’
18
 preferred employee behavior.   
                                                          
13
 See, e.g., TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR:  THE PLOT AGAINST 
PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 260-74 (2008).  
14
 Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 74-78 (2012). 
15
 Tom Harkin, The Retirement Crisis and a Plan to Solve It, 5-7 (2012), 
http://www.harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/5011b69191eb4.pdf. 
16
 See infra Part VI.B.4. 
17
 See Harkin, supra note 15 (proposing to relieve employers of fiduciary obligation if 
they use the new fund structure).  Differences between my proposal and Senator Harkin’s 
plan are discussed infra throughout Part VI.  
18
 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 6 (2008).  A nudge, according to the 
authors, is “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way w/out forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives.” Id. at 6. 




Part III provides a brief description of Australia’s approach to retirement wealth 
creation and its financial services-based trust model.  Australia’s reform of its regulation 
of default investments offers lessons for the U.S.  The expert panel that developed the 
reform package explicitly based its approach to defaults on choice architecture principles.   
Part IV addresses the intersection of default settings and fiduciary obligation in the U.S.  
It explains that the current allocation of fiduciary responsibility is attributable to the very 
different system of retirement plans that was in effect when the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA)
 19
 was passed in 1974 and its trust-based regulatory 
structure was established.  The Part discusses application of the U.S. employer-centric 
trust model in the context of plan investments, including default investment products.    It 
concludes that although both Australian and U.S. policymakers have facilitated the use of 
defaults, the U.S.’s employer-centric model produces a very different result than 
Australia’s financial services-centric approach.  Failings of the U.S. approach are evident 
in the Department of Labor’s (DOL) post-financial crisis regulatory initiative on 401(k) 
plan investment defaults.  The analysis shows that continued reliance on an employer-
based trust model has compromised U.S. regulatory efforts that were intended to improve 
the use of default investment products.  In contrast, Australia’s reforms include 
enhancement of its financial-services-based trust and fiduciary model.   
Part V considers other 401(k) reform proposals, which take a government-centric 
approach.  In Part VI I offer an incremental proposal that would retain most of the 
features of the current 401(K) system while reallocating certain fiduciary responsibilities 
and creating a new default investment product, Safe Harbor Automated Retirement 
Products (SHARPS).
 20
   The proposal addresses the current fiduciary misalignment 
present in the U.S. employer-based model and leverages choice architecture insights to 
increase the number of employees who will build wealth for retirement and the amount 
they will accumulate.   
   
II. Choice Architecture and Allocation of 401(k) Decisions and Responsibility 
  
This Part begins by describing choice architecture and its intersection with 
behavioral economics.  The next section explains the distribution of decision making in 
the current 401(k) plan regime between employers and employees. That discussion 
considers ways choice architecture may be used to affect decision making.  The last 
subsection contains significant analysis and discussion of the relevant literature regarding 
                                                          
19
 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, ERISA §§ 1-4402, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006). 
20
 Although the name bears a resemblance, there is no relationship intended with the 
well-known “Sharpe ratio” used in analyzing investments. See Houman B. Shadab, The 
Law and Economics of Hedge Funds:  Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 264 n.152 (2008) (“The Sharpe ratio is the most common way 
of measuring risk-adjusted returns.”).  I also hope it does not suffer any negative 
connotations from the pejorative “sharp business practice.”  See, e.g., Jeremy A. Rabkin, 
War, International Law, and Sovereignty:  Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New 
Century:  Recalling the Case for Sovereignty, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 435, 440 (2005) 
(referring to “’economic coercion’ from sharp business practices”).    




investment decision making, which supports my ultimate recommendation is for the 
creation of a new investment vehicle for use in 401(k) plans. 
 
A. Choice Architecture – an Overview 
 
The term “choice architecture” was coined by Thaler and Sunstein in their 
influential 2008 book describing how nudges can change decision making.
21
  A choice 
architect “has the responsibility for organizing the context in which people make 
decisions.”
22
  Choice architecture describes the organization of that context (such as the 
structure of a 401(k) plan) and how that organization affects decisions (such as 
employees’ investment decisions).  In that way it is similar to the way the architecture of 
a building affects the way the building is used.
23
  
Choice architecture relies on behavioral economics.   As a field, behavioral 
economics draws from psychology and economics to explain why human behavior 
sometimes departs in “persistent and consistent”
24
 ways from that predicted by traditional 
utility maximizing economic theory.
25
   It is because decision making departs from those 
predictions that a choice architect’s organization of decision making context may affect 
those decisions.  Researchers in behavioral economics have identified a number of 
heuristics and biases that help to explain systematic departures from the decision making 
predicted by classical economics.
26
  It is those specific insights from behavioral 
economics that choice architects may use in structuring a decision making context in 
order to nudge a desired outcome. 
 A significant body of literature by economists evaluates how behavioral 
economics can be used to influence the design of retirement plans.
27
  This article does not 
attempt to either repeat or summarize the entirety of that continually evolving body of 
work.   Instead, the rest of this section focuses on their findings on employee engagement 
with 401(k) plans.   
Experiments conducted by behavioral economists reveal that many employees are 
willing to make only a minimal time commitment to retirement plan management.  
Participants in a study conducted by Professors Benartzi and Thaler spent on average less 
than an hour making asset allocation decisions and few of those participants reviewed 
                                                          
21
 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 3.  
22
 Id.  
23
 See id. 
24
 Swee-Hoon Chuah & James Devlin, Behavioural Economics and Financial Services 
Marketing:  A Review, 29 INT’L J. BANK MKTG. 456, 457 (2011). 
25
 See generally Sendhil Mullainathan, & Richard Thaler, Behavioral Economics, MIT 
Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 00-27 (2000) (providing an overview of 
behavioral economics), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=245828. 
26
 See, e.g. Chuah & Devlin, supra note 24, at 457-58 (listing the factors covered in their 
review of financial services marketing). 
27
 See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 108-11; Olivia Mitchell & Stephen 
Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral Finance for Retirement Plan Design, Working Paper 
2003-6 (PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL, Philadelphia Pa.) 2003, at 1-25, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=464640. 




any material other than that supplied by the investment providers.
28
  Another indicator of 
employee disinterest in making investment decisions is how rarely employees change the 
asset allocations in their defined contribution (DC) plans.  They fail to revisit their initial 
investment allocation decisions or to rebalance their account portfolios even if their 
personal circumstances or financial market conditions change substantially.
29
  One study 
found that over the lifetime of a group of university employees, the median number of 
asset allocation changes was zero.  Another, more recent study, similarly found that 
nearly half of the employees with accounts did not change their asset allocations during 
the ten-year study period.
30
   
Research on financial literacy also provides discouraging data for the retirement 
prospects of many employees.  One relevant study considered the before-and-after test 
results from a group of employees who received financial literacy education.  The net 
result of the education was a one-point increase in the employees’ test scores, from 54 to 
55.  Purely random answers should have scored 50 because the test consisted of true/false 
responses.
31
   
Fortunately, opportunities increasingly exist at the regulatory and employer level 
to utilize the employee disengagement and passivity evidenced in the studies just 
discussed.  As shown in the next section, choice architecture provides evidence that plan 
decision making formally allocated by law to employees is affected by default and 
framing decisions made by employers.  Some employers have used these insights to 
construct plan terms to increase the likelihood that their 401(k) plans will provide higher 
levels of benefits to more employees.    
 
B. Choice Architecture and 401(k) Plans 
 
In the next three subsections, I consider the interaction between choice 
architecture and the regulatory allocation of decision making.  The first subsection below 
explains a setting where the decision authority rests solely with the employer.  In the 
latter two subsections, though, the allocation of decision authority changes depending on 
whether the authority is viewed through a legal lens or a choice architecture lens.   
 
1. Plan Sponsorship – Employer Decision  
 
The first decision to be made regarding a 401(k) plan
32
 is made by an employer
33
 
and that choice is whether to offer a plan at all.  The U.S. private sector retirement plan 
                                                          
28
 Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Risk Aversion or Myopia? Choices in Repeated 
Gambles and Retirement Investments, 45 MGMT. SCI. 364, 375 (1999). 
29
 See Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision to 
Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
361, 376 (2002). 
30
 See Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral 
Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. OF POL. ECON. S164, S168 (2004). 
31
 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 112. 
32
 See infra text accompanying note 160-61 regarding the scope of 401(k) plans.  




system has always been one of voluntary sponsorship.
34
  As a result an employer may 
choose to offer a 401(k) plan, another type of plan, or no plan.   
Of the more than $10 trillion of wealth held by Americans in tax-favored accounts 
intended to promote retirement security, $3.4 trillion is held in 401(k) plans.
35
  Across the 
world, retirement-type plans are categorized as DC plans or defined benefit plans (DB).
36
  
In DC plans, the investment risk resides on employees, not employers.  Upon retirement, 
employees typically are entitled to whatever amount has accumulated in their DC plan 
account.
37
   401(k) plans are a type of DC plan.  The defining quality of a 401(k) plan is 
that each employee who is eligible to take part in a 401(k) plan must have the right to 
choose to contribute, or not to contribute, pre-tax earnings to that employee’s own plan 
account.
38
  That individual employee decision making power on whether to contribute is 
one of the reasons that choice architecture plays such a powerful role in the success of 
401(k) plans as long term wealth accumulation mechanisms.
39
  
Some specialized terminology is important in understanding the outcomes of 
employer decisions on plan sponsorship.  The extent to which employees have the option 
to contribute to 401k plans or to take part in other types of plans are analyzed as coverage 
rates.
 40
   In comparison, the rates at which employees actually decide to make 
contributions or otherwise accumulate savings in the plans are known as participation 
rates.
41
  In DB plans, which traditionally did not accept let alone require employee 
contributions, coverage and participation rates are typically equal or close to equal.
42
  In 
plans such as 401(k)s, where employee contributions are optional, coverage rates may be 
significantly higher than participation rates.
43
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
33
 The standard 401(k) plans discussed in this article must be sponsored by employers, 
who then nearly always act as the plan sponsors.  See ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) 
(2006) (requiring plans to be sponsored by an employer or an employee organization). 
Therefore the terms employer and plan sponsor are used interchangeably. 
34
 See Dana M. Muir, From YUPPIES to GUPPIES:  Unfunded Mandates and Benefit 
Plan Regulation, 34 GA. L. REV. 195, 209-11 (1999) (discussing the history of voluntary 
plan sponsorship in the U.S.). 
35
 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 4 (reporting as of Mar. 31, 2012).  
36
 See Dana M. Muir & John A. Turner, Constructing the Ideal Pension System, in 
IMAGINING THE IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM:  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 4-10 (Dana M. 
Muir & John A. Turner, eds., 2011) (discussing pension system in a number of countries 
as defined benefit (DB) or defined contribution); see also infra text accompanying notes 
152-55 (describing DB plans).  
37
 Dana M. Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA’s Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L. 
REV. 201, 205 (1995). 
38
 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 254 (Dana M. Muir ed., 2d ed. Supp. 2010) [hereinafter 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 2010 SUPP.]. 
39
 See infra Part II.B.2. 
40
 Muir & Turner, supra note 36, at 24.  
41
 Id.  
42
 Kathryn L. Moore, An Overview of the U.S. Retirement Income Security System and the 
Principles and Values it Reflects, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 18 n.104 (2011). 
43
 See infra text accompanying notes 57-58. 




The percentage of employees covered by any type of retirement-style plan is 
dependent on the definition of the employee population being analyzed.  Analysis by 
Professor Munnell and colleagues found that, as of 2010, approximately 58 percent of 
full-time employees between the ages of 25 and 64 were covered by a private-sector 
employer-sponsored retirement plan.
44
  In 1979 coverage for the same population was 
above 65 percent.
45
   The data on which this research was premised does not break out 
401(k) plans.  Another data set indicates that, as of 2010, approximately 68 percent of the 
employees who have access to a pension plan are covered by a 401(k) plan.
46
  Another 
13% of employees with pension coverage have a 401(k) and another type of plan.
47
 
The lack of access to plans affects particular categories of employees more than 
others and access has declined over the 40-year period studied.  Small employers are less 
likely than larger ones to offer retirement plans. At employers with less than one hundred 
workers, another researcher estimated that only 49 percent of employees have access to a 
plan.
48
   
 




 assuming an employer has chosen to offer a 401(k) plan, 
one of the identifying factors of that type of plan is that employees have the right to make 
voluntary contributions.  When considered using a regulatory lens, therefore, the entire 
decision making authority on voluntary contributions is allocated to employees.  
Historically, plans provided that contributions would only be withheld from the wages of 
employees who affirmatively comply with the plan’s procedures for designating a 
voluntary contribution.
50
  Using the regulatory lens, the failure of many employees to 
enroll and contribute to 401(k) plans was attributed to employee decision making.
51
 
                                                          
44
 Alicia Munnell et. al., The Pension Coverage Problem in the Private Sector, (CTR. FOR 
RET. RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLL., Boston, Mass.), Sept. 2012, at 1, http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/IB_12-16.pdf. 
45
 See id. at 2, fig. 1. 
46
 Alicia Munnell, 401(k) Plans in 2010:  An Update from the SCF, (CTR. FOR RET. 





 William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-Based Retirement 
Benefits, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., at Table 1, 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/print/cm20110927ar01p1.htm. 
49
 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
50
 See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization, 46 
ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 66 (2004) (“Most 401(k) plans require affirmative enrollment by 
employees . . .”). 
51
 See, e.g., Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCrouch, Social Security Reform:  
Lessons from Private Pensions, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 307 (2007) (“In making 
decisions about participation . . . more than a quarter of all eligible employees do not do 
so at all.”); James M. Poterba, Individual Decision Making and Risk in Defined 
Contribution Plans, 13 ELDER L. J. 285, 306 (2005) (“[S]ome 401(k) plan participants 




A choice architecture lens, however, shows that employees and employers each 
play a role in determining whether an employee who is covered by a plan actually 
accumulates any assets in the account through contributions. One of the insights of choice 
architecture is that employer decisions about plan default settings can significantly affect 
whether employees contribute to a 401(k) plan they are covered by, and, if so, the rate at 
which they contribute.
52
 The general concept of default settings is that they may enable 
401(k) contributions to be made with no effort on the part of individual employees.  The 
default settings are determined by the employer as part of the employer’s decision-
making on the basic structure of plan terms.
53
  Employers always choose a participation 
default setting for 401(k) plans; however, sometimes those decisions are made implicitly. 
In the historic approach, discussed above,
54
 the default setting was ‘no participation.’  
Thus, if the employee did nothing, the employee did not contribute to the plan. 
Re-setting the default on participation in 401(k) plans from ‘no participation’ to 
‘participation’ is an example of the affirmative use of choice architecture.
55
  In so called 
automatic enrollment plans, the employer establishes plan terms that default employees, 
unless they make an express decision to decline participation (to opt-out), into plan 
participation.
56
  Although the ultimate decision remains with employees, this option 
requires an action on their part to override the enrollment.  
In these automatic enrollment plans, employees retain the power not to contribute, 
but studies have found that the structure of the decision making (whether the default for 
those who do not affirmatively decide is no participation or participation) dramatically 
affects participation rates.  One model indicates that prior to the use of automatic 
enrollment, 66 percent of eligible workers participated in 401(k) plans.  Immediately after 
introduction of automatic enrollment, participation increased to 92 percent.
57
  The group 
                                                                                                                                                                             
make decisions that . . . fail to take full advantage of the opportunities for 401(k) plans to 
contribute to their retirement income security.”).  
52
 See infra text accompanying notes 57-58, 64.  
53
 See Vada Waters Lindsey, Encouraging Savings Under the Earned Income Tax Credit:  
A Nudge in the Right Direction, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 83, 113 (explaining availability 
of sample provisions to employers adopting or amending a 401(k) plan). 
54
 Supra text accompanying note 50.  
55
 Default settings are not the only way that the configuration of plan terms may be used 
to affect employee participation.  Other basic plan terms, such as whether the employer 
“matches” the contributions made by employees or otherwise contributes to the plan are 
affected by complex rules intended to ensure that 401(k) plans are fairly available and 
used across a broad spectrum of employees, not just by those who are highly 
compensated. Susan Stabile, Is it Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based 
Pension System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 305, 318 n.60 (2007).   
56
 Moore, supra note 42, at 21. 
57
 Sarah Holden & Jack VanDerhei, The Influence of Automatic Enrollment, Catch-Up, 
and IRA Contributions on 401(k) Accumulations at Retirement, INVESTMENT COMPANY 
INST. at 4 (2005), http://www.ici.org/pdf/per11-02.pdf. 




with the highest effect from automatic enrollment is the group most at risk of retirement 
income inadequacy, low income workers.
58
   
An employer that establishes a plan with an automatic enrollment default must 
also set a default that determines the employee’s degree of participation.  Whether or not 
the enrollment was automatic, an employee’s participation requires a decision on how 
much the employee will contribute.  Where the employer makes a decision to 
automatically enroll employees then the employer faces a range of options in setting the 
level of the employee’s contribution. A strategy focused on maximizing wealth creation 
might choose a setting aligned with the maximum pre-tax contribution permitted by the 
Internal Revenue Code.
59
  A strategy of achieving the highest ratio of employer match to 
employee contribution could be set at the lowest contribution level required to trigger the 
maximum match.
60
 For an employee population typically reluctant to participate in such 
plans, for example workers at the lower end of the pay scale for example, a default setting 
at a low dollar or fixed percentage that increases over time might be selected.
61
   
One criticism of automatic enrollment features is that some simulations predict 
that a substantial portion, perhaps up to 40 percent, of new hires at companies that use 
automatic enrollments save less in their 401(k) plans than they would have in the absence 
of automatic enrollment.
62
 This prediction is based in part on the fact that most plans set 
the default contribution rate at 3 percent, whereas employees who affirmatively elect to 
participate in plans tend to contribute at 5-to-10 percent of salary.  Depending on the 
assumptions used, some percentage of employees who would otherwise actively enroll 
and contribute at the higher rates are likely instead to default into plans with automatic 
enrollment.  Again, depending on the assumptions, those employees may save less than 
they otherwise would have.
63
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However, studies of the overall effect of automatic enrollment in the current 
401(k) system, indicate that use of those default provisions increases savings for the 
majority of employees who participate in the plans.
64
  An author of the study cited for the 
proposition that up to 40 percent of participating employees save less in automatic 
enrollment plans, pointed out in response that the 40 percent outcome resulted from the 
most pessimistic set of the sixteen sets of assumptions modeled in the study.    
Furthermore it is the higher paid employees who may contribute at higher rates outside of 
automatic enrollment, a right they have even in plans that use that default setting.  
Perhaps more importantly, data consistently show that lower income employees 
experience the greatest percentage benefit from automatic enrollment plans because it so 
significantly increases the likelihood they will contribute.
65
   For those low income 
employees who would not have contributed to a 401(k) plan that requires an affirmative 
participation election, regardless of the default contribution level set by the employer, it 
is larger than the zero rate at which those employees would otherwise have saved.  
Debating the effect of automatic enrollment plans on initial contribution rates 
ignores another insight of choice architecture for 401(k) plan structure.  Plans may adopt 
a default setting that leverages employee passivity to increase contributions.  Plans that 
use automatic escalation set a low initial default contribution rate but periodically 
increase employees’ contribution rates unless employees opt otherwise.
66
   The plan may 
even time rate increases to coincide with employee raises.
67
 That avoids employees 
experiencing a decrease in take-home pay.  As one would expect, it appears that 
automatic escalation significantly increases employee wealth in 401(k) plans, particularly 
for lower paid employees.
68
  A survey in 2010 indicated that approximately 28 percent of 
the 401(k) plans sponsored by large employers utilize automatic escalation features.
69
  
In sum, once an employer has unilaterally decided to sponsor a 401(k) plan, the 
decision on whether an employee voluntarily contributes and, if so, the amount of those 
contributions is often thought about as a decision that is delegated to employees.  
However, choice architecture shows that employer decisions on plan default settings 
affect participation and contribution rates.  Given the passive behavior of individual 
investors, it has been amply demonstrated that two strategies that successfully increase 
the numbers of employees who contribute and the amount they contribute to 401(k) plans 
are automatic enrollment and automatic escalation.  Those strategies turn investors’ 
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passivity into a retirement wealth accumulation advantage.   Although the default setting 
for contribution levels is a key factor, and may be influenced by factors outside the scope 
of this Article, without employer sponsorship and employee participation, contribution 
levels are a non-issue.  Contributions alone, however, do not a comfortable retirement 
make. The next subsection considers the investment of those contributions.  
 
3. Investments – Shared Choice 
 
Investment selection at the employee account level
70
 in 401(k) plans has, like 
contributions, often been regarded as a decision that is typically made by employees.
71
  In 
fact, in plans that meet specified regulatory criteria, employers are relieved of the 
fiduciary liability associated with account level investment selection.
72
  Not surprisingly, 
most plans comply with those criteria.  Because in U.S. pension parlance the employees 
and their beneficiaries who participate in benefit plans are known as participants, those 
plans are known as participant-directed plans.
73
 
Again, as with contribution decisions, the behavioral economics literature 
provides the basis for a more sophisticated understanding of account level investment 
decisions, requiring acknowledgement that the structural decisions employers make about 
plans affect employees’ investment decisions.  The insights of choice architecture have 
led to the development of default mechanisms to counteract negative effects of employer 
decisions on plan investment menus and how those menus are presented.
74
  At the same 
time the default mechanisms leave ultimate power over account level investment 
decisions with those employees who affirmatively choose to exercise it.   
Every 401(k) plan that uses automatic enrollment must set a third default in 
addition to the positive contribution default and the default specifying the contribution 
amount. That third default is the investment product that will hold the contributions in the 
employee’s 401(k) plan account.
75
   Employees who affirmatively exercise their right to 
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Regulation and employer choice of investment default settings have changed 
significantly since 2007.  Before evaluating that regulation and its impact, the next 
subsections explain the findings of the behavioral economics literature on plan 
investment-related terms, decisions regarding the number of investment options, and 
employer matching contributions made in employer stock.    
   
  a. Number of Investment Options  
 
401(k) plans vary significantly in terms of the investment options they offer.
77
  
This subsection considers the non-intuitive problem created by an overabundance of plan 
investment options and contrasts it with behavioral patterns found in plans with a small 
number of options. 
 Current law provides an incentive for an employer to offer at least three 
investment options in its 401(k) plan.  In participant-directed plans employers not only 
shift the investment risk to their employees,
78
 they also avoid fiduciary liability for 
employees’ account level investment decisions. In order to qualify as participant-directed, 
among other requirements, a plan must offer at least three investment options that have 
sufficient variety in their risk and return characteristics to permit employees to select a 
portfolio appropriate for their needs.
79
  
One of the early behavioral economics studies of employee decision making in 
benefit plans was conducted by Professors Thaler and Benartzi and involved a choice 
between two investment options.
80
  They asked two groups of university employees, 
faculty and staff, to allocate their retirement accounts.  Each study participant chose from 
one of three menus of investment options.  The menus were:  (1) a stock fund and a bond 
fund; (2) a stock fund and a balanced fund that was invested half in stock and half in 
bonds; and (3) a bond fund and a balanced fund.
81
  The study determined that employees' 
allocation decisions depended heavily upon the menu from which the employee selected 
investments.
82
  That is to say that the decision was not based on objective merits of the 
investment, rather it was influenced by the combination of investment options. The group 
that selected between the stock and the balanced fund allocated the largest percentage of 
assets to stock, followed by the group with the stock and bond fund.
83
 The group offered 
the bond and balanced fund allocated the lowest percentage of assets to stock.
84
 The 
experiment illustrates what is known as the 1/n heuristic, which describes the tendency of 
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  As an example of the 1/n heuristic in action, Thaler and Sunstein quote Dr. 
Harry Markowitz, who co-won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on 
modern portfolio theory.
86
  Speaking about his own retirement account, Dr. Markowitz 
said that: “’I should have computed the historic covariances of the asset classes and 
drawn an efficient frontier.  Instead . . . I split my contributions fifty-fifty between bonds 
and equities.”
87
  Rather than making a decision, or receiving guidance, even the most 
financially sophisticated investors may resort to unsophisticated schemes for allocating 
their retirement dollars. 
Problematic decision making is not limited to plans with a small number of 
investment options and most plans offer substantially more than three options.  One 
recent study found that the average number of options offered was eighteen.
88
  At the 
seventy-fifth percentile firms offered twenty-one options.
89
  This is a situation, though, 
where more is not necessarily better.   
Research indicates that when the range of choices becomes too large for 
employees to make investment decisions using a simplified heuristic, such as the 1/n 
heuristic,
90
 some employees become immobilized and tend not to make a decision.
91
  In 
fact, the same study showed that as the number of investment options increases, 
employees’ participation in plans without automatic enrollment decreases.  Plans with 
sixty options had participation rates of approximately 60 percent whereas plans with two 




That delta of 15 
percentage points represents an increase of 25 percentage points causally associated with 
the reduced complexity of the investment options. 
 In sum, there may be a Goldilocks-like effect with plan investment options.  A 
few options will result in less than optimal employee investment allocations because 
many employees will use the 1/n heuristic.  A large number of options will decrease the 
likelihood employees will participate in a plan without automatic enrollment.  The closest 
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to a “just right” choice arguably is for employers to designate a default investment 
vehicle.  This article discusses those vehicles in some detail in Part IVA.3. below.     
 
  b. Employer Stock 
 
In another group of studies, behavioral economists explored the use of employer 
stock in 401(k) plans.  Professors Thaler and Sunstein summarized the consistent results 
of studies on the behavior of employees who automatically receive some stock of their 
employer in their 401(k) plan.  These employees, when presented with the option to 
direct stock purchases, invest a higher percentage of their contributions in employer stock 
than do similarly-situated employees in plans where employees do not receive automatic 
allocations of employer stock.
93
  Behavioral economists speculate that the explanation for 
this behavior is that employees view the automatic allocations of employer stock as 
implicit advice that the stock is a good investment.
94
  As a result, employees rely on this 
tacit guidance in making their investment decisions. 
Thaler and Sunstein underscore the risk associated with this overinvestment in 
employer stock, citing the example of an Enron employee who retired in 2000 with $1.3 
million worth of Enron stock.  The value of that stock fell to zero the following year in 
the Enron bankruptcy.
95
  Though extreme, this is just one individual at one company 
among the many individuals at many companies who have wagered their retirement 
security on the financial success of their employer.  In the late 1990’s estimates indicated 
that 30-to-40 percent of the assets held by employees in 401(k) plans that permitted 
employees to invest in employer stock were held in that stock and that the highest level of 
concentrations were held by lower paid employees.
96
  Employers now are less likely to 
match contributions using employer stock or to provide it as an investment option to 
employees, perhaps because of the potential fiduciary risk.
97
  The phenomena of reliance 
on the tacit guidance of employers, however, will be relevant below in the discussion of 
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  First, though, the next Part looks at the Australian 
approach to private-sector retirement plans and its reliance on choice architecture to 
reform default investment product regulation. 
 
III.  Long-term Retirement Wealth Accumulation Down Under – the Australian 
Approach 
 
A.    Australia’s “Mandatory” System of Workplace Retirement Savings 
 
As is the case with most retirement systems, including that of the U.S., Australia’s 
pension system consists of three components:
 99
  (1) a government-administered program 
funded through general revenues, the Age Pension, which pays monthly benefits to 
retirees who need those benefits as determined by income and asset tests;
100
 (2) some tax 
incentives for individual savings, and (3) an employment-based system.
101
  The focus in 
this Article is primarily on the third component of the Australian system – the 
employment-based component, which has come to be known as the Superannuation 
Guarantee (SG System).
102
  The SG System developed in the early 1990s through the 
Australian approach to setting wages and benefits by using industry awards.
103
  At the 
outset, the SG System required
104
 employers to contribute 3 percent of most earnings for 
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most employees to an individual DC account.
105
  The rate of contribution has increased 





 may begin withdrawing funds from their SG System accounts when 




The SG System’s mandatory contribution requirement does provide for a few 
exceptions.  Contributions are not mandatory for employees who earn below a stipulated 
amount per month, individuals below age 18 or over age 70, and the self-employed.
109
  
On the other hand, although the 9 percent rate is the minimum level for contributions for 
most Australians, it does not act as a ceiling.  Additional monies can be saved in the SG 
System through one of two approaches.  An employee may elect to set aside a portion of 
their future salary, an election that is known as a “salary sacrifice.”  In that case, the 
employer forwards the contribution to the employee’s SG System account.
110
  
Alternatively some employers and employees may enter into enterprise agreements or 
individual employee contractual arrangements to make contributions at a rate above the 9 
percent minimum.
111
  By 2007 the ability of individuals to make voluntary contributions 
to SG System accounts expanded to the point that any unretired Australian of at least age 
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15 could contribute to their own SG System account or receive contributions in their 
account from their spouse’s after-tax income.
112
  
Coverage estimates from a 2007 survey indicate that 94 percent of Australian 
employees were members of the SG System.
113
 Another indicator of the success of the 
Australian SG System has been its ability to grow pension assets. According to a study of 
thirteen countries with significant pension systems, during the ten year period ending 
with December 2008, Australia’s pension assets grew at the fastest rate among those 
countries and at more than triple the rate of growth in the U.S. system.
114
    SG System 
assets totaled $1.301 trillion as of the end of 2011.
115
   
Between the early 1990s and mid-2005, nearly all SG System assets were held in 
industry funds, company-sponsored funds, or public sector funds.  Industry funds were 
established on an industry-by-industry basis and governance of the funds was divided 
between employers and employees.
116
  In mid-2005 members began to receive the right 
to choose both the ‘fund’ and the investment product within a fund to receive the SG 
System contributions made on their behalf.
117
  Fund choice gave a boost to for-profit 
funds, known as retail funds, which are not affiliated with a particular industry or 
employer but instead parallel U.S. mutual funds.
118
   
From a broad perspective, default settings are used in fewer contexts in Australia 
than in the U.S. because of the structure of the SG System.  Because contributions to the 
system are mandatory for nearly all Australian workers, there is no need for a default 
setting on participation. The statutory minimum of 9 percent nullifies the need for a 
default contribution setting.  However, once SG System members received the right to 
choose both the fund and the investment product that would receive their contributions, 
investment default settings became important because some employees fail to make an 
explicit choice.  
Various mechanisms are used to determine the default investment product.  In 
some instances the default fund and product are negotiated through what are called 
enterprise agreements or modern awards, which replace the system of industry awards.
119
  
In other situations the employer typically selects a fund and product to receive 
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contributions made on behalf of the employees.
120
  Industry funds currently hold more 
assets than any other fund category.
121
  Default investment products have proven to be 
popular in the SG System.  In recent years, 68 percent of the assets held in industry funds 
were held in the default product of the particular fund.
122
   
 
B. Choice Architecture in Default Investment Reforms  
 
Partly in reaction to the global financial crisis and its negative impact on 
retirement savings, in May 2009 the Australian Minister for Superannuation and 
Corporation Law announced a review of the entire SG System.
123
 The review was 
undertaken by a full time chairperson, Jeremy Cooper, assisted by five part-time 
members.
124
    In December 2011, the panel issued a two-part report, the “Cooper 
Report,” on its findings and recommendations.
125
 The Cooper Report contained ten 
packages of recommendations.
126
  The Australian government supported most of them
127
 
and later issued the key design elements of the overall reform, which it has named 
Stronger Super.
128
  As of this writing, the Stronger Super reforms are at the stage of draft 
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  Because it appears nearly certain the basic reform package will be enacted, 




The Cooper Panel explicitly relied on choice architecture to shape Australian 
reform to serve employees with various levels of interest in engaging with their SG 
System accounts, including those who prefer minimal engagement.
131
  Surveys and data 
show that Australians follow a pattern similar to that of U.S. 401(k) participants 
discussed early in this Article.
132
  Many Australians are passive with respect to their 
investments, do not make active plan choices, and have limited financial literacy.
133
  
Others, however, are actively engaged in management of their plan account.
134
  The 
Cooper panel determined that Australia’s SG System should be structured to maximize 




Recognizing that choice architecture highlights the importance of defaults for 
disinterested employees, the Cooper Panel developed a framework for a new type of 
default investment product, “MySuper.”  Once the reforms are implemented, MySuper 
products will be the only permitted type of default investment product.  In addition, 
employees who wish to make explicit investment decisions may designate a MySuper 
product to receive their contributions.
136
 
The framework is relatively simple.  In general, SG System funds will each be 
permitted to offer a single default MySuper investment product. MySuper products will 
only be allowed to provide a limited menu of services and are expected to have relatively 
low fees.  Those fees will be reported in such a way as to make them comparable across 
MySuper products.  The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) will gather 
and make public data on MySuper product performance and fees to facilitate competition 
among the offerings.
 137
  The Cooper Panel also addressed fiduciary responsibility and the 
operating standards for MySuper products.  Its approach is discussed in the next Part. 
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IV. Fiduciary Obligations, Trust Models, and Choice Architecture  
 
This Part begins by describing the U.S.’ employer-centric approach to assigning 
fiduciary responsibility for private-sector pension plans.  It analyzes that approach as 
applied to investment of 401(k) account assets, including the use of default investment 
products.  Next, the Part compares the financial-services based fiduciary model 
developed by Australia.  The Part ends by comparing the reaction of the two countries to 
the performance of default investments during the global financial crisis. 
 
A. Employer-Centric Trust Model – U.S.   
 
1.   Regulatory Framework 
 
ERISA includes a set of fiduciary provisions that are based in traditional trust law.  
ERISA’s counterpart to the trust law duty of loyalty is found in its requirement that 
fiduciaries act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and... for the 
exclusive purpose of... providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries."
138
   The 
statute sets the fiduciary standard of care as that of a prudent person familiar with the 
benefit plan matters at issue.
139
   ERISA’s other substantive fiduciary standards require 
benefit plan fiduciaries to minimize the risk of large losses by diversifying plan 
investments
140
  and to act in accordance with plan documents.
141
 
ERISA modifies traditional trust concepts to fit the benefit plan paradigm.
142
  
These modifications are particularly evident in ERISA’s definition of who bears fiduciary 
responsibilities and the scope of those responsibilities.  Whereas traditional donative 
trusts typically had a single or limited numbers of trustees designated by the trust 
instrument to hold the trust property,
143
 ERISA fiduciary status may arise either through 
designation or by an action that is defined as giving rise to fiduciary status.
144
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144
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In ERISA’s employer-centric trust model, employer actions in creating, 
amending, and terminating a benefit plan, such as a 401(k) plan, are treated as being 
similar to the actions taken by the creator of a traditional trust.  Thus, they are known as 
“settlor” functions.
145
  In contrast, ERISA fiduciary actions are those involving 
discretionary plan administration, asset or plan management, or investment advice.
146
  
In this model all employers that sponsor 401(k) plans are fiduciaries with respect 
to the plan for at least some actions.
147
  This is because employers necessarily appoint 
and monitor the plan fiduciaries that engage in plan administration, management, or 
provide any available investment advice; and the appointment and monitoring functions 
are fiduciary acts.
148
  A typical 401(k) plan may have numerous fiduciaries, including a 
plan committee.
149
  But, in the employer-centric trust model, ultimately the power of all 
fiduciaries derives from the employer’s direct or indirect delegation of authority.  
 
2.  Fiduciary Status for Plan Investments  
 
The selection of and risk associated with plan investments has shifted 
significantly since ERISA’s fiduciary provisions were enacted in 1974.  Senate 
investigations prior to ERISA uncovered repeated misuse and diversions of pension plan 
assets by the entities charged with responsibility for those assets.
150
  By the time the 
legislation that was to become ERISA reached the conference committee, both the House 
and Senate versions imposed duties of care and loyalty on plan fiduciaries.
151
  
At that time DB plans were the primary type of retirement plan in the U.S. and 
401(k) plans did not even exist.
152
 Employers promised, through DB plans, to pay 
monthly benefits for a retiree’s lifetime.  Those benefits typically were based on a 
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147
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formula that takes into account employee salary and years of work with the employer.
153
  
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, if a DB plan held insufficient funds to pay the promised 
benefits, retirees and employees would lose some or all of those expected benefits.
154
  In 
conjunction with minimum DB plan funding rules, avoiding that outcome was one of the 
primary motivators of ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.
155
 
In the DB system, where employers voluntarily created pension plans, established 
the formulae for benefit payments, funded the plans and made the investment decisions, 
the parallel with a traditional trust settlor was reasonably strong.  Because employers bore 
the investment risk in such plans
156
 they had incentives to develop expertise regarding 
investment of plan assets.   For employees the plan funding and fiduciary regulations had 
the potential to ensure that they received their promised plan benefits without having to 
develop investment expertise or to engage in extensive monitoring.  This division of 
responsibility and authority in DB plans aligned with the classic understanding of 
fiduciary relationships as being efficient when a party acting on behalf of another 




The decline of DB plans has been widely analyzed and frequently bemoaned.
 158
   
But for better or worse defined contribution (DC) plans currently constitute the primary 
wealth-accumulation vehicles, other than possibly their homes, for the retirement security 
of many Americans.
159
  In terms of assets, DB plans sponsored by private-sector 
employers held an estimated $2.5 trillion as of June 2011.
160
  In comparison, DC plans 




In terms of the trust model and related fiduciary provisions, 401(k) plans differ on 
the dimensions of control and required expertise on investment decision making as well 
as on risk allocation.  As with DB plans, it is employers that establish 401(k) plans.
162
  
And, the requirement that assets be held in trust applies to 401(k) plans.  But, as 
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 employees typically bear the investment risk and make the account 
level investment decisions for their plan account.  An employer who establishes a 401(k) 
plan may avoid fiduciary duty associated with the account level investment decisions by 
ensuring that the plan meets regulatory safe harbor criteria.
164
  Thus, the alignment of 
401(k) plans with the traditional defining factors of a fiduciary relationship between 
employees and employers is much lower than the alignment that existed in the DB plans 
that were the primary pension vehicle at the time the statutory fiduciary model was 
established.  
Employers cannot avoid all fiduciary responsibility associated with 401(k) plan 
investments however.  The determination of investment options must be made in 
accordance with ERISA’s fiduciary standards of prudence and loyalty.
165
 As discussed 
below,
166
 this concept is important in the context of default investment selection because 
it means that currently employers have fiduciary responsibility for those choices.  
Although there is a dearth of case law on the predominant type of default investments, the 
principle of fiduciary liability for selection of investment menu options has arisen with 
some frequency in two contexts.  The first is the use of employer stock as an investment 
alternative.
167
 The second context comprises claims that employers did not act with the 
proper degree of care or loyalty when establishing plan menus that contain investment 
products with unreasonably high fees.
168
   
The cases alleging inappropriately costly investment products are more useful for 
thinking about fiduciary liability associated with default products than the employer stock 
cases because ERISA contains specific provisions permitting, and arguably encouraging, 
the use of employer stock.
169
  The General Accounting Office, in a study of 401(k) plan 
fees and disclosure, summarized one aspect of the fees problem as follows:  “[I]t is hard 
for [employees] to make comparisons across investment options because they have to 
piece together the fees that they pay, and assessing fees across investment options can be 
difficult . . .”
170
  Plans use of a variety of mechanisms to charge for plan administration, 
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investment management, and other services exacerbates the problem.
171
   Because of the 
complexity, comparing fees across plans and investment alternatives is difficult for even 
sophisticated investors.  The anticompetitive effect of the lack of transparency is 
confirmed by studies finding significant variations in fees across 401(k) account 
holders.
172
 Perhaps then it is not surprising that employees have brought a number of 
lawsuits alleging that employers acting as 401(k) plan sponsors breached their fiduciary 
duties by choosing investment options with unreasonably high fees.  The results of the 
litigation have been mixed,
173
 generating costs for employers and limited compensation 
for payments of high fees for employees.  The DOL’s response has been to increase 
mandatory disclosure that plan service providers must issue to plans
174
 and, in turn, the 
disclosure that plans must provide employees.
175
  
The oddity from a fiduciary perspective is that some of those service providers 
recommend, and effectively determine, plan investment menu options, including the 
allegedly high fee options, but have no ERISA fiduciary obligations in the current 
employer-centric fiduciary model.  Fiduciary responsibility frequently does not extend to 
the consultants and financial services entities that advise employees on selection and 
monitoring of plan investments or to the investment managers that make the fee-related 
and investment decisions for the mutual funds and similar products that constitute typical 
plan account investment products.
176
  This is an artifact of the DB plan system.  Shortly 
after ERISA was passed, the DOL defined through regulation a narrower set of criteria 
for when investment advisers become fiduciaries than provided for by the statutory 
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  By conforming its actions to the regulatory definition, a financial adviser 
can avoid fiduciary responsibility for advice provided on the selection of a 401(k) plan’s 
investment menu.  Recognizing that the plan paradigm has shifted substantially since the 
regulation was issued, in 2010 the DOL issued a proposed regulation to harmonize the 
scope of the regulatory definition with that of the broader statutory provision.
178
  The 
proposal drew a firestorm of opposition and in September 2011, DOL withdrew the 
proposed regulation.
179
  As of the writing of this article, it appears the DOL is in the 
process of revising the proposed regulation and plans to re-propose them.
180
  
In sum, ERISA established trust-based fiduciary duties that govern employer 
actions as well as those of other plan fiduciaries.  The ultimate fiduciary responsibility, 
though, frequently lies with the employer, who is responsible for appointing and 
monitoring other fiduciaries.  In the DB era, the employer-centric fiduciary approach 
aligned with the traditional concept of assigning fiduciary obligation when one party had 
superior expertise and control.  The transition to DC plans means, though, that employers 
no longer make direct decisions on the investment of plan assets.  Nor do they bear any 
investment risk for those decisions. Instead, the employer’s role, vis-à-vis investments, is 
to select and monitor the menu of investment products available to employees.  DOL 
recognition of limitations on the effectiveness of the employer-related model in the 
401(k) paradigm led it to attempt to impose fiduciary obligations on the advisory 
community.  A discussion of the implications of those efforts is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  But, the DOL’s concern highlights the general problem of fiduciary liability for 
selection of 401(k) plan investments.  The next section discusses the employer-centric 
model in the specific setting of default investments. 
 






 the IRS authorized the use of auto enrollment defaults in 
401(k) plans.  A number of concerns slowed employer implementation though.  Potential 
                                                          
177
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182
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liability claims associated with the employer’s choice of the default investment selection 
led the list of concerns, which also included potential conflicts with state statutes 
regulating wage garnishments.  As well, there was no incentive for employers to take on 
these risks.
183
   
Employer adoption of default settings began to change after the enactment of the 
Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA),
184
 which provided an incentive for plans to use 
defaults.
185
  Final regulations, issued by the DOL in 2007, to implement the PPA partially 
eliminated fiduciary liability for employers who select “qualified default investment 
alternatives” (QDIAs) as the investment default for their plan.
186
 
The 2007 final regulations essentially provide the same protection to the employer 
as the employer would have for any investment explicitly designated by an employee in a 
participant-directed plan.
187
   As explained by one commentator:  “[P]articipants who do 
not direct the investment of their accounts will be treated as if they had, if the fiduciaries 
invest their account in a [QDIA].”
188
  The protection for employers, however, is only 
partial.  The final regulation makes clear that:  “Nothing in this [regulation] shall relieve a 
fiduciary from his or her duties under . . . ERISA to prudently select and monitor any 
[QDIA] under the plan or from any liability that results from a failure to satisfy these 
duties, including liability for any resulting losses.”
189
  Even if the employer appoints an 
individual or a group of individuals to make the actual QDIA selection, the employer 
remains obligated as a fiduciary to monitor those decision makers.
190
   
Four types of investment products qualify as QDIAs.  First, a short-term, capital 
preservation product, which may be used for the first 120 days of an employee’s plan 
participation, is the only conservative product.
191
  Three categories of long-term products 
meet the requirements to be QDIAs.  Two must be appropriate to the individual 
characteristics of the specific employee.
192
  Specifically, “targeted-retirement-date” 
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industry professional explained that:  investment strategies targeted to a retirement date, 
“rebalance on an ongoing basis and adjust allocations as [an employee] ages…”
195
  
Approximately 60 percent of the 401(k) plans with a default investment feature now 
designate a TDF as the QDIA.
196
  Fourth, a QDIA may consist of a product that contains 
investments tailored to account for characteristics of the plan participants as a group. 
197
 
Compared to the fiduciary responsibility of employers, the fiduciary responsibility 
of experts who provide advice on selection of a QDIA to the ERISA fiduciaries is more 
complex.  Because of the narrow definition established in the 1975 regulations,
198
 the 
professionals that provide advice on QDIA selection can quite easily avoid becoming 
ERISA fiduciaries.
199
  Those professionals may be subject to other federal laws 
depending on their status and the scope of advice they provide.  As a general matter those 
who are compensated for providing advice related to investments in securities are subject 
to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act).
200
  As with ERISA, however, a 
number of exceptions exist from Advisers Act regulation.
201
 The SEC has considered the 
extension of fiduciary obligations to a wider variety of advice providers but whether, and 
if so, when that will happen remains uncertain.
202
  
The net result of U.S. default regulation, then, is that employers are responsible as 
fiduciaries for the selection and monitoring of default (and all other) investment products 
offered in their plans.  Investment professionals, including expert advisers, may become 
involved in providing information and advice regarding the selection of QDIAs for plans. 
However, those experts frequently do not have fiduciary obligations to the employer, the 
401(k) plan, or to the employees whose retirement assets are invested.
203
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Finally, recall that most QDIAs being used by plans are TDFs, which usually are 
organized as mutual funds.   Thus, the entity that holds the TDF’s assets is almost 
certainly an investment company subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940.
204
  
This inserts another layer of regulation, but not much additional protection for employees 
or employers. The relationship between mutual funds and their investment advisers has 
been described by Donald C. Langevoort, highlighting the conflict of interest:  “The 
typical mutual fund is organized by a sponsor who expects to profit by providing 
advisory and other services to the fund, with returns growing as the fund grows in 
size.”
205
  And ERISA explicitly provides an exemption from fiduciary status for mutual 




B. Financial Services-Based Model – Australia 
 
Trust law and fiduciary obligation is an important concept in Australia’s SG 
System.  The fiduciary obligations of care and loyalty, although country-specific in the 
details, parallel the U.S. approach in their general application.
207
  However, Australia 
uses a financial services-based trust model rather than the U.S.’ employer based-model.  
Whether organized as an industry fund, an employer-sponsored fund, or a retail fund, 
from the beginning of the mandatory SG System the investment vehicles that hold 
account assets have been governed by entity trustees (sometimes referred to as corporate 
trustees).
208
  Trust and fiduciary principles apply to the relationship between that trustee 
and the employees’ whose SG Account assets are invested in the fund.
209
 Legislation 
reinforces the trust and fiduciary principles by requiring that trust documents of SG 
System funds include covenants on the basic trust law duties of loyalty and care. 
The locus of the loyalty and care obligations with the trustee of the relevant 
investment funds is as consistent within the context of the development of the SG System 
as the U.S. employer-based model was during the era of the DB system.  The U.S. system 
recognized that employers not only established DB plans but also funded them, 
controlled their investments, and established benefit levels.  Locating the “buck stops 
here” fiduciary exposure with employers was consistent with their expertise and 
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  In Australia, though, the SG System is mandatory, minimum contribution 
levels are mandatory, and DC plans have always been the primary type of SG System 
plan.
211
  Funds established and managed by a single employer hold less than 5% of SG 
System assets.
212
  Instead of establishing a separate fund, employers typically remit 
contributions to either an industry or retail fund governed by an entity trustee.
213
  Once 
employees received the statutory right to choose among any qualified investment fund, 
the role of employers was limited, at most, to input on the selection of the default 
investment fund and it appears that the employer owes no particular level of care in 
making this selection.
214
  Given the comparative lack of employer expertise and 
involvement with administrative and investment matters, the Australian decision to locate 
fiduciary-like obligations of care and loyalty with investment fund trustees was logical.  
Consistent with that history, the regulatory approach to MySuper default products 
imposes an enhanced set of duties on MySuper fund trustees and on the boards that 
govern the trustees.
215
  Employers play no significant role and having no significant 
liability in this system.  The enhanced obligations of MySuper trustees essentially will 
operate as an additional layer of duties on top of the basic set of requirements that applies 
to all entity trustees of funds that hold SG System assets.  The enhanced duties required 
of MySuper entity trustees are to:   
“● promote the financial interests of MySuper members, in 
particular net returns; 
● annually assess sufficiency of scale; and 
● Include in their investment strategy an investment return target 
and level of risk for MySuper members.”
216
 
To be clear, although determination of the investment strategy is within the scope 
of the trustee’s obligations, the choice of strategy is constrained.  One of the 
requirements for MySuper products is that the fund trustee “would have to 
formulate and give effect to a single, diversified investment strategy at an overall 
cost aimed at optimizing fund members’ financial best interests, as reflected in the 
net investment return over the long term.”
217
 In addition trustees must be licensed 
and meet specific standards with respect to the operation of a MySuper product.
218
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The entity trustees that hold SG System assets are governed by a board of 
directors.
219
 The trustee-directors of any fund that offers a MySuper product also will be 
subject to an enhanced set of duties.  Each trustee-director will have an obligation to 




The imposition of enhanced standards on the trustees and directors of MySuper 
products is consistent with the Cooper Panel’s finding that Australia’s earlier decision to 
grant employees the right to choose investment funds and products failed to achieve a 
competitive fund market and optimal investment decision-making.  The Panel observed 
that the failure of many employees to affirmatively make a fund election contributed to 
the lack of an efficient market for SG System funds, but other factors also play a role.
221
  
According to the Panel, employees lack awareness of the performance and fees 
associated with their retirement investments.
222
  In part this is because they do not 
actively make payments into their accounts and, in many cases, do not expect to access 
the funds for many years.
223
  In addition fund performance and fees often can be difficult 
to compare and switching funds takes effort and time.
224
  
Mr. Cooper summarized the goals of MySuper this way: 
MySuper would have a number of features designed solely with the 
[employee] in mind:  specific trustee duties designed to deliver lower cost 
outcomes for members; increased transparency leading to better 
comparability, especially of costs and long term net performance; 
provision of intra-fund advice; simpler communications; and an embedded 
retirement product.  It has been designed to sit within existing 
superannuation structures and is based on existing widely-offered and 




The astounding fact to any reader familiar with the U.S. employer-based fiduciary 
approach is that nowhere in Mr. Cooper’s summary of MySuper is there a single 
reference to employers.
226
 Instead of the employer-based model used by the U.S., 
Australia’s approach to fiduciary obligation within its SG System has always been, and 
continues with MySuper to be, a financial services-based model.  
 
 C. A Choice Architecture-based Comparison of the U.S. and Australian 
Models 
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 As noted above,
227
 one of the motivating factors for the Australian SG System 
reforms, including the attention to default investments was the effect of the global 
financial crisis on employees and retirees.  Similarly, the financial crisis motivated the 
DOL to examine whether TDFs held as QDIAs performed effectively in 401(k) accounts 
during that time period.
228
  This section briefly describes the effect of the financial crisis 
on U.S. and Australian retirement savings accounts before comparing the DOL’s 
response on default investments with Australia’s reform efforts. 
 
 1. The Global Financial Crisis and Retirement Savings Accounts 
 
Not surprisingly, the global financial crisis resulted in substantial loss of wealth in 
401(k) plans, particularly in the early years of the crisis.  After all, in the U.S., the S&P 
500 index,
229
 the Dow Jones industrial index,
230
 and the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000
231
 each 
lost between 34 and 37 percent in 2008.  Economic modeling indicates that the shift from 
DB to DC plans also is a factor in increasing the percentage of individuals over age 60 
who remain in the workforce.
232
   
 The Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) has been a leader in modeling 
401(k) data using its EBRI/ICI database, which includes more than 20 million plan 
participants.
233
  Even prior to the economic downturn, EBRI projections of income 
replacement rates
234
 likely to be generated by 401(k) accounts varied from a range of 21- 
to-26 percent at the low end to 51-to-69 percent at the high end, depending upon 
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assumptions for worker participation.
235
  In the early period of the crisis, EBRI estimated 
that the effect of the financial downturn on the size of 401(k) accounts depended, in 
addition to the extent to which accounts were invested in equities, on account size, age, 
and job tenure.
236
  In smaller accounts, new contributions had a larger effect than 
investment losses.  As a result, net account balances in small accounts actually were 
estimated to have increased in 2008.
237
  However, estimates indicate that accounts with 
balances of over $200,000 averaged losses of more than 25 percent.
238
    
A typical investment pattern driven by professional guidance would change as the 
investor approached retirement, reducing the proportion invested in volatile equities to a 
more “age-appropriate” level.   Significant numbers of employees, however, retain 
equity-rich investment blends into their late ‘50s and beyond.
239
  The investor passivity 
observed in behavioral economics research should lead policy makers to conclude that at 
least some of these employees did not regularly assess their 401(k) account investments 
and decide to engage in such a high-risk strategy.  Instead, many of them are likely to 
have selected an investment mix at the time they entered the plan and never changed it. 
 Estimations of losses in account value due to high levels of equity investment 
illustrate the potential problem.  Professor Munnell and colleagues used Vanguard data, 
which showed that the age 54-65 cohort went in to the financial crisis holding an average 
of 67 percent of their account assets in equities.
240
  Using U.S. stock market performance 
data based on the Wilshire 5000 for the one year period from October 8, 2007 (the peak 
of the U.S. markets) to  October 9, 2008,  they found that the average  account value for 
that cohort dropped by 30 percent.
241
  Similarly, when researchers at the Urban Institute 
modeled the effects of the market crash they determined that most DC account holders 
born prior to 1945 will experience a 10.1 percent decrease in retirement income even if 
the stock markets make a full recovery after ten years.
242
 
The mandatory contribution of 9 percent of earnings may have helped to slightly 
mitigate the effect of the global financial crisis on the Australian superannuation system.  
Although the Australian S&P/ASX200 index dropped slightly more than the comparative 
U.S. equity indices, at 38.45 percent as compared to 37 percent, a study estimated the 
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decline in total retirement assets in the U.S. at 18.9 percent as compared to a 16.2 percent 
decline in Australia.
243
  But, the short-term impact of the declines on Australian 
employees was a shock, just as it was in the U.S.   
One study that modeled the effect of the financial crisis on older Australian 
employees estimated that those employees would need to raise their contribution levels 
significantly in order to retire with the account balances they would have accumulated in 
the absence of the crisis
 244 
 For example, the modeling showed that an employee who 
was 51 years old at the end of the crisis would have to save 19 percent of earnings for the 
next nine years to offset the effect of the crisis.
245
  Assuming accounts returned long term 
average results after the crisis, employees between the ages of 30 and 40 at the end of the 
crisis would need to save an additional 1-to-2 percent per year until retirement to offset 




2. Default Investments - U.S. and Australian Responses to the Global 
Financial Crisis 
 
In the wake of the financial crisis, U.S. regulatory concern about default 
investments focused on TDFs.  The DOL and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) held joint hearings in 2009 to consider issues regarding TDFs that had surfaced 
during the economic downturn.
247
  They summarized the concerns expressed during those 
hearings as including a perceived lack of understanding by investors, including 401(k) 
account holders, of the risks of TDFs.
248
  Similarly some hearing participants argued that 
TDF marketing materials might have caused investors to misunderstand the strategies 
undertaken by those funds.
249
   
The Senate Special Committee on Aging (Aging Committee) issued a White 
Paper in late 2009 addressing TDF issues that went beyond disclosure problems.
250
  One 
might expect generic TDFs with equivalent target dates to have reasonably similar asset 
allocations.
 
 Yet, the Aging Committee reported that: “[T]he allocation of assets among 
stocks, bonds, cash-equivalents [sic] varied greatly among target date funds with the 
same target retirement date, with select firms’ 2010 target date funds’ equity holdings 
ranging anywhere from 24 to 68 percent.”
251
  As noted above, large allocations in equities 
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performed poorly during the economic downturn, so not surprisingly given the 
heterogeneity in asset allocations, the performance of TDFs during 2008 varied 
substantially.
252
  One explanation given for the differing levels of equity holdings is that 
the goals of funds with respect to their target date may range from achieving a maximum 
asset accumulation as of that date to managing to a low or zero balance on that date 
because the date was defined as an expected mortality date.
253
  Recent research indicates 
that another cause of the variation in investment allocations is due to the increased risk 
appetite of new TDFs as compared to longer established TDFs.
254
  
The second substantive weakness that the Aging Committee identified with TDFs 
was a variance in expense ratios, with a minimum of 0.19 percent and a maximum of 
1.82 percent.
255
  Because of the long term nature of 401(k) accounts, even small 
differences in fees can have an important effect on wealth accumulation.
256
  Some 
commentators believed that one explanation for higher fees in some TDFs was due to the 
layering of fees that occurs when TDFs invest in other funds or even in funds of funds.
257
  
This is one front on which TDFs have made progress since the Aging Committee’s 
report.  A 2012 study found that TDF fees have declined, perhaps because of economies 
of scale and competition.
258
 
The regulatory response to the congressional investigation and agency hearings 
has been to increase education and disclosure efforts.  First, in mid-2010 the DOL and 
SEC published a joint investor bulletin intended to educate investors about TDFs.
259
  In 
addition, the DOL reevaluated the disclosures provided when 401(k) plans use TDFs, 
particularly when they serve as QDIAs.  The proposed regulatory revisions rely entirely 
on enhanced disclosure obligations.  Specifically, the DOL’s proposed regulations, 
developed in collaboration with the SEC, would require that participants in TDFs, 
including participants defaulted into those funds designated as QDIAs, be provided with 
specific information about the TDF.
260
  The mandatory disclosure would have to discuss 
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asset allocation and the way in which the allocation changes over time.
261
  It also would 
be obligated to address the fees and costs, and include a warning that losses are possible 
in TDFs.
262
   
Increasing the disclosure about TDFs, while perhaps the only tool available to the 
DOL without statutory amendment, fails to respond to the problems of varying asset 
allocations and high fees in a way that is consistent with the insights of choice 
architecture and behavioral economics.  First, the investor passivity that is the basis for 
encouraging both automatic enrollment and default investments with appropriate levels of 
diversification means that increased disclosures and education will be ineffective in 
changing the behavior of many employees who are defaulted into those investments.  One 
of the primary purposes of default settings is to recognize investor passivity and use 
defaults as nudges to achieve better results.  An expectation that 401(k) account holders 
who are defaulted into TDFs will read disclosures, understand them, and act upon them 
ignores the behavioral economics research.   In fact, the research on employee behavior 
regarding employer stock indicates that, to the extent that employees are not disengaged 
from investment decision making, they may rely on their employer’s choice of a default 
investment as tacit guidance that the vehicle is a good investment.
263
  
Second, a significant body of research indicates that “mandated disclosure as a 
remedy . . . is often ineffective.”
264
 Studies in behavioral branches of psychology, 
economics, and ethics as well as cognitive science indicate that disclosure often fails to 
enable the person receiving the disclosure to act rationally.
265
   And, in fact, mandatory 
disclosure may result in worse substantive behavior by the person providing the 
disclosure.
266
   
Compare Australia’s very different approach to the regulation of default 
investment products in the post-global financial crisis era.  The Australian reform 
explicitly relies on the principles of choice architecture to leverage investor passivity to 
increase wealth accumulation.  It does this by imposing a combination of regulatory 
requirements and fiduciary-based obligations on MySuper products to ensure they are 
reasonably appropriate for the SG System account holders who are defaulted into those 
investments.     
Although Australian employers will be obligated to choose a MySuper product 
that is registered as such with ASIC, those employers have no fiduciary obligation in the 
choice or oversight of the MySuper product.  Instead, the trustee and board of the 
MySuper product bear not just the standard fiduciary obligations of fund trustees and 
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board members but also the enhanced responsibility to ensure that the investments and 
fees are appropriate for the employees whose retirement savings are invested in their 
MySuper product.   Thus, in Australia, the responsibility for default investment vehicles 
coincides with both the locus of investment expertise and the responsibility for 
investment strategy.   Or, to state it slightly differently, consistent with the traditional 
allocation of fiduciary responsibility, the investment-related obligations owed to those 
whose retirement assets are invested with MySuper funds will reside with those who have 
the expertise and power to manage the funds.  In contrast, the U.S. approach has been to 
increase disclosure to employees, which is inconsistent with the point of QDIAs and the 
behavioral economics findings on investor passivity. 
 
V. Proposals for 401(k) Reform – Mandates 
 
Commentators have long worried that the 401(k) system would fail to enable 
large numbers of Americans to accumulate sufficient assets to enjoy a secure retirement.  
This Part briefly summarizes some of the relevant data on that point.  It then turns to a 
brief review of some of the alternative retirement savings systems suggested by others.  
The common thread among those proposals is reliance on a government mandate that 
employers provide access to retirement savings vehicles, although the scope of the 
mandates varies. 
 
 A. Inadequacy of the Current System 
 
Although some 401(k) investors, either through prudent investing or through the 
luck of the draw, have created sufficient wealth for a secure retirement, the problem of 
too little wealth accumulation for too many is extensive and long-term.  One problem is 
that due to inadequate and consistent savings patterns employees simply do not 
accumulate enough assets in these plans.
267
  The implications for U.S. workers are best 
understood in terms of the overall lack of retirement readiness.  An analysis by the Center 
for Retirement Research at Boston College concluded that households “at risk” of having 
retirement income at age 65 that was inadequate increased from 43 percent in 2004 to 44 
percent in 2007 and 51 percent in 2009.
268
  
The view of researchers looking from the outside in on retirement readiness is 
confirmed by the perspective of those considering their own prospects for retirement. The 
2011 Retirement Confidence Survey reported that the confidence levels of Americans in 
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their prospects for a comfortable retirement are at an all-time low.
269
   The number of 
workers who do not believe they will have enough money in retirement increased by 5 
percentage points to 27 percent.
270
  They expect this will dramatically affect their 





B. Mandatory Systems  
 
1. Guaranteed Retirement Accounts 
 
Perhaps the most carefully developed and argued alternative to 401(k) plans is the 
proposal developed by Professor Theresa Ghilarducci.  The system she advocates, 
Guaranteed Retirement Accounts (GRAs),
272
 would replace all DC plans, including 
401(k) plans.  An employer with a DB plan that meets specified minimum criteria would 
be permitted to substitute that plan for a GRA.
273
 GRAs would be funded through 
mandatory contributions of 2.5 percent of salary paid by each employers and employers 
(for a total of 5 percent).
274
  Every individual, regardless of income, who contributes to a 
GRA would receive a refundable federal tax credit of a flat amount, estimated at $600 
annually.
275
  Individuals would have government administered accounts and investment 
decisions would be made by the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), which administers and invests 
the DC accounts of federal employees.
276
 
The investment vehicle associated with GSAs would differ significantly from the 
current TSP.  Federal employees have the right in TSP to allocate investments among a 
six fund menu.
277
  Other than the fund comprised of U.S. Treasury securities, the funds 
are managed by a private-sector financial services firm.
278
  These are structured as typical 
mutual funds, vary in risk, and the accounts of federal employees reflect the investment 
gains or losses of the funds.
279
  It is unclear whether Professor Ghilarducci contemplates 
direct management of GRA investments by the Board of the TSP or by professional 
managers selected and monitored by that Board.  Either way, she advocates a guaranteed 
annual investment return of 3 percent for the GRAs of individual workers.
280
  Unlike the 
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existing funds in the TSP, the GRA assets would thus be protected and even continue to 
grow in periods of financial market downturns but would experience limited returns when 
markets are thriving.  At retirement, individuals could elect to receive up to 10 percent of 





2. Middle-and-Low Income Mandates 
 
 Professor Schwartz recently proposed a similar government-run system that also 
would replace 401(k) plans.
282
  In the Schwartz system, employers would be obligated to 
transmit employee contributions to an investment account designated by an employee.
283
 
Employers would be permitted but not required to contribute to the accounts.
284
  Because 
that is the extent of their involvement, employers would play a reduced role in this 
system as compared to in 401(k)s.  
Government, however, would provide a larger role because it would match the 
contributions of low-and-middle income workers
285
 and it would designate a private 
sector fund manager to invest the assets.
286
  The level of the government match would 
equal the amount of the current tax subsidies.
287
  Left unspecified are: (1) any future 
adjustments to the government match; (2) whether the match would replace only 401(k) 
tax incentives, all private-sector employer-sponsored pension-related tax incentives or 
also the incentives that currently exist for Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs); (3) the 
rate of match calculated as a factor of salary; and (4) the levels of earnings at which 
workers would be entitled to the match.  
The Schwartz system relies on nudges for employee contributions and the 
investment designation.  The low-and-middle income workers who would be entitled to a 
government match would be automatically enrolled in the system at a contribution rate 
that would entitle them to the maximum government match for their income level.
288
   
Those employees would be permitted to opt-out of the system.
289
  High-income workers 
would be permitted to establish accounts
290
 and presumably would be entitled to elect to 
investment in the government-selected default fund.  Other than the right to invest in that 
fund, it is unclear what incentive high income individuals would have to participate in 
this system.  Because the matches for low-and-middle income earners are to be funded 
using the entire amount of current tax incentives, the Schwartz system does not appear to 
contemplate any tax incentives to encourage high income workers to save within the 
system.  
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The default investment product would consist of a portfolio made up of a U.S. 
equity index fund and treasury-inflation protected securities (TIPS).
291
 While not 
formally promising a guaranteed minimum investment return, the use of TIPS is intended 
to provide a “guarantee[d] return of principal in real terms at retirement.”
292
 The 
allocation between equities and TIPs, and thus the effective guarantee, would vary 
according to employee age.
293
  The federal government would assume from employers 
the obligation to appoint the manager of the default fund.
294
  To reinforce the investment 
nudge, an employee who elects other than the government-selected default fund might 
lose some or all of the government matching contribution.
295
 
In sum, Professor Schwartz advocates replacing the 401(k) system with one that 
would impose limited requirements on employers -- to transmit contributions from 
employees who either elect to contribute to the new system or are defaulted into that 
system.  The federal government would assume responsibility for funding matching 
contributions for low-and-middle income workers.  A federal agency would be charged 
with designating, and although not discussed, presumably with overseeing, a single 
private-sector investment manager to run what would quickly become a multi-trillion 
dollar fund.
296
   
 
3. USA Retirement Funds 
 
The most recent of the major reform proposals is that of Senator Tom Harkin, the 
Chairman of the Senate Health Education Labor & Pensions Committee.  Unlike 
Professor Ghilarducci’s Guaranteed Retirement Accounts and Professor Schwartz’s 
system, Senator Harkin’s plan would exist within the current 401(k) system rather than 
replacing it.
297
  Employers would be permitted to continue their current 401(k) or other 
retirement plans.  An employer that does not offer a plan meeting the minimum criteria 
would be required to default employees into a newly created type of private sector 
pension plan, a Universal, Secure, and Adaptable (USA) Retirement Fund.
298
 Under the 
default system employees would be permitted to opt out.
299
  Employers would have to 
make “modest contributions”
300
 on behalf of employees and low wage workers would be 
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entitled to government contributions.
301
  It is not clear whether employees who opt out of 
the plan would receive the employer or government contributions.  It also is not clear 
whether employees would have any choice among USA Retirement Funds; the only 
reference to choice in Senator Harkin’s plan is that employers choose the default fund.
302
 
The innovative structure of USA Retirement Funds merges the administrative 
responsibilities of accepting contributions, calculating, and reporting benefit entitlements, 
investing assets, and paying benefits.
303
  All benefits would be paid as life annuities.
304
 
There are indications that employees would have individual accounts because the 
proposal states that: “The amount of a person’s monthly benefit would be determined 
based on the total amount of contributions made by, or on behalf of, the participant and 
investment performance over time.”
305
  But, the proposal also contemplates risk sharing, 
the type and amount of which is ambiguous.  That risk sharing delegates to the trustees of 
each fund the flexibility to gradually increase or decrease benefits depending on 
investment performance.
306
  This obviously is incompatible with a system that calculates 
individual benefits based purely on account balances.  The proposal contemplates that 
benefits would be “entirely portable”
 307
 across USA Retirement Funds, but it is not clear 
how that portability would work in the context of risk pooling.  
The fiduciary responsibility for USA Retirement Funds would lie with the fund 
trustees charged with plan management.
308
  Trustees would represent various 
constituencies:  employees, retirees and employers.
309
  USA Retirement Funds would be 
licensed by an unspecified entity.
310
  Employers would not have any fiduciary liability for 
the selection of a USA Retirement Fund for their employees and in fact would be 
permitted to “use the ‘default’ fund identified for the region, industry, or through 
collective bargaining.”
311
  Presumably a federal agency would determine the default fund 
for various region and industries.  
In sum, the reform proposals set forth by Professors Ghilarducci and Schwartz 
and Senator Harkin differ in their details but each would confront basic problems in the 
current 401(k) system.  All three proposals would make some level of employer 
participation mandatory.  All three proposals include at least default coverage for all 
workers of low-and-middle income.  Senator Harkin’s plan would extend the default to 
all employees.  Professor Ghilarducci’s plan would mandate contributions by and on 
behalf of all employees.  
Each proposal also provides for an investment vehicle.  In the systems suggested 
by Professors Ghilarducci and Schwartz, the government would be heavily involved in 
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the selection and oversight of a single investment product.  This alone is enough to be of 
concern to those familiar with the investment policy struggles of the PBGC.
312
    
Professor Ghilarducci would not permit any employee choice regarding the investment.  
Senator Harkin’s proposal provides for a variety of private-sector investment vehicles 
and, like Professor Ghilarducci’s would require risk sharing across employees. But it 
does not appear that employees would have any choice of investment vehicle in USA 
Funds; instead the fund designation is made by employers.  
    
VI. SHARPs – Nudges and Realignment of Fiduciary Responsibility 
 
This Part begins by engaging with the ideology underlying the three reform 
proposals outlined in Part IV.  After arguing that it is useful to consider a less 
government-centric approach, I offer an alternative proposal.   
 
A. Government-Centric Retirement Security Provision in the U.S.  
 
Each of the proposals outlined above relies on a government mandate.  Mandates 
are consistent with the Australian SG System, which this Article looks to for default 
investment product principles that are consistent with choice architecture.  But, to 
understand the ideology underlying mandates and universal coverage in the SG System, it 
is necessary to put the private sector system in the context of Australia’s Age Pension.  
The public pension program in Australia, the Age Pension, is a welfare-type of safety net 
system.  Only retirees who pass both asset and income tests are entitled to receive Age 
Pension benefits.
313
  The universal system of earned retirement income is the SG System, 
which relieves the pressure on the Age Pension by ensuring that the vast majority of 
workers have retirement savings accounts. 
In the U.S., it is Social Security that provides a basic retirement benefit for nearly 
all workers.
 314
   In that sense Social Security is more like Australia’s SG System than its 
Age Pension.  In fact, in some ways as a universal system Social Security is superior to 
the SG System.  Social Security benefits are based on an earnings-related formula, which, 
unlike the SG Systems structure, protects pensioners against financial market 
fluctuations.
315
  Perhaps the most important factor in the consistent overall support that 
Social Security has had among the American populace is what one expert referred to as 
the “characterize[ation of Social Security benefits] as an ‘earned right.’”
316
   Unlike the 
Australian Age Pension, ideologically Social Security is not a welfare plan, although it 
does have a redistributive aspect.
 317
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The ideology underlying the three reform proposals discussed in Part IV better 
aligns with the ideology of the Social Security system than with the private-sector 
employer-based system.  Professor Ghilarducci’s proposal to mandate employer and 
employee contributions on behalf of all employees could be achieved through higher 
Social Security contribution rates.  And, she suggests that the Social Security 
Administration administer her proposed GRAs.  Again, like Social Security, her approach 
includes a benefit “guarantee.”  Similarly, the guaranteed benefit and effort to enhance 
retirement income streams for low-to-middle income Americans suggested by Professor 
Schwartz could be met through increased Social Security contribution requirements for 
those individuals, perhaps even with an opt out, or more redistributive calculations.  
Senator Harkin’s mandate that all employees be defaulted into a savings plan is the least 
easily wrapped into the Social Security system since he calls for individual accounts 
invested in a competitive environment of multiple private sector investment vehicles. 
But, the conservative investment focus, risk sharing, and annuity requirement of Senator 
Harkin’s plan share aspects of the Social Security system.   
These three proposed plans purportedly are intended to operate alongside Social 





 both advocate strengthening Social Security.  Professor 
Schwartz points to the political risk inherent in the government-funded nature of Social 
Security as a rationale in support of his proposal.
320
  Ironically, though, the overlap in 
ideology between these plans and Social Security may further imperil Social Security and 
the long term viability of any of the three reform proposals that is adopted.  The explicit 
or implicit federal guarantee on the investment of assets in these reform proposals creates 
substantial political risk. Even if the government does not explicitly back those 
guarantees, implicit expectations will exist based on the government’s regulatory role in 
establishing the guarantees and involvement in investment decisions.
321
   Furthermore, 
the use of individual accounts in conjunction with mandates may provide fodder for those 
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who believe Social Security should facilitate individual investment accounts.
322
  And, if 
every employee is defaulted into a savings-type of account or, under Professor 
Ghilarducci’s plan is mandated to participate in such a plan, opponents of Social Security 
may argue that its universal coverage is much less important than in the current system of 
voluntary plan sponsorship.  In short, any of these proposals may be viewed as ‘the’ basic 
retirement system for American workers, replacing the role the Social System has played 
since its enactment.  
 
B. SHARPs – A Fiduciary Model Built on Choice Architecture 
 
In this section, I offer an alternative approach that is ideologically consistent with 
the traditional U.S. system of voluntary employer-sponsorship.  In fact, it would operate 
within the existing 401(k) system.  Two characteristics of Australia’s approach to default 
investments inform this proposal.  First, Australia has incorporated into the SG System 
the recognition that many people who opt, implicitly or explicitly, into the default 
investment products do not want to be actively involved in monitoring the investments in 
their accounts.  Second, Australian reforms are structured to address the reality that 
employers also may not have the expertise or the inclination to become experts in 
investment product selection and monitoring.  The administrative and investment 
products that I recommend, Safe Harbor Automated Retirement Products (SHARPs), 
leverage both of those aspects of the Australian approach while retaining the 
philosophical goals of avoiding employer mandates and enabling some employee 
investment choice. This section sketches the proposed regulatory framework for 
SHARPs, discusses how they would be integrated into the current 401(k) system and 
explains how they would:  (1) increase 401(k) plan sponsorship by decreasing barriers to 
employer plan sponsorship; (2) introduce greater integrity and appropriate diversification 
into default investment products; and (3) increase participation through the use of 
defaults.   
 
1. Decreased Barriers to Plan Sponsorship  
 
SHARPs would replace QDIAs and, as an incentive for employers to use default 
settings in 401(k) plans, would provide employers with safe harbor protection from 
fiduciary liability for the selection and monitoring of SHARPs.  With SHARPs, 
employers would be relieved of the onerous task of qualifying and monitoring the myriad 
products they should consider as the default investment product for their plan.  As well, 
they could be assured that they would not face the potential litigation costs or liability of 
the sort sought in the 401(k) employer stock and fee lawsuits.
323
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In order to further incent 401(k) plan sponsorship by the most reluctant group, 
small employers,
324
 those employers should be permitted to offer participant-directed 
401(k) plans that offer only two SHARP products – one as the default product and a 
second to provide employees with an alternative.  Most employers elect to sponsor 401(k) 
plans as participant-directed plans because, although the employer retains fiduciary 
liability for the selection and monitoring of the plan’s investment options, the employer 
has no liability for actual investment decisions made by an employee.
325
  As discussed 
above,
326
 to qualify as a participant-directed plan currently a 401(k) plan must offer a 
minimum of three investment options that together and separately meet a variety of 
requirements for the plan.  Those standards would remain unchanged for medium and 
large employers.   
The use of SHARPs to relieve employers of the costs and risks of fiduciary 
obligation in the choice of default investment products will remove that roadblock to plan 
sponsorships.  SHARPs would provide a second incentive for small employers. In 
addition to investment management, each SHARP would be required to provide, as a 
fiduciary and at an employer’s option, all necessary administrative and reporting services.  
Small employers could rely on the two SHARP products for those services, freeing small 
employers of all ongoing administrative obligations and liability.  Medium and large 
employers may find it more appropriate to retain a single plan administrator and only use 
a SHARP’s investment management services. 
 
2. Greater Integrity and Appropriate Diversification of Investment Products 
 
Elimination of employer fiduciary obligations for SHARPs will not result in a loss 
of protection for employees.  In lieu of employer fiduciary obligation for SHARPs, I 
propose a two-part mechanism consisting of: (1) assigning fiduciary responsibility to the 
investment managers and fund directors that determine and implement a SHARP’s 
investment strategy; and (2) licensing by and reporting to a federal regulatory agency.  
The disclosure requirements would promote the ability to make competitive comparisons 
among SHARPs. 
In addition to the reporting requirements, SHARPs would be restricted to only a 
limited set of features, including administrative features.  As with the financial services-
centric allocation of fiduciary duty, this limitation is modeled after the Australian reform.  
The notion underlying SHARPs is that they are default funds with their primary market 
being employees who prefer not to be deeply engaged in their 401(k) plan investment 
decision making.  Thus, there is no need to permit frequent transfers into and out of 
SHARPs, daily access to account balances, and other features that add costs and increase 
volatility.   Requiring each SHARP to offer a uniform set of administrative features will 
provide economies of scale for the small employers who choose to rely on SHARPs to 
provide those services and promote competition through comparability. 
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The investment strategy of SHARPs is critical to employees’ wealth 
accumulation.  SHARPs would be permitted to use any investment strategy that currently 
would meet the QDIA requirements.
327
 To drive investor-focused performance and low 
fees, the investment managers of SHARPs would have fiduciary liability to act in the best 
interest of the participants, including determination, disclosure, and implementation of an 
appropriate asset allocation strategy.  As a final check, the board members of a SHARP 
would be responsible for its compliance with regulatory standards and its disclosed 
strategy.   
Admittedly, the restriction of investment strategies to those currently permitted of 
QDIAs will somewhat limit innovation in SHARPs.  Gains in this tradeoff, however, are 
that the investment focus is on appropriate diversification and regulators will be better 
able to vet compliance with licensing requirements.  Furthermore, the restriction on 
investment strategies will limit the investment choices only of employees at small 
employers who choose to rely on the participant-directed safe harbor of offering two 
SHARPs within their 401(k).  Employees who are covered by other 401(k) plans will 
continue to have the opportunity to choose from the array of investments offered by their 
plan in addition to any SHARPs on their plan’s menu.  Once participants enter the 
retirement-age distribution phase, they would be required to roll their assets into a non-
SHARP investment vehicle.  This will incentivize investment companies and annuity 
providers to develop innovative, competitive, and appropriate products for retirees. 
  In its efforts to protect individual investors, the current regulation of default 
investment products relies primarily on disclosure to employees as a supplement to 
employer fiduciary obligation in the selection and monitoring of default investment 
vehicles.
328
  In contrast, the SHARPs regime would rely on allocation of fiduciary 
responsibility to the investment managers that manage those products and on appropriate 
regulation and disclosure. In assessing the viability and importance of such a shift, 
consider the lessons realized from the use of default investment products during the 
financial crisis. Some TDFs incurred significant losses because they maintained 
substantial equity allocations even for investors with near-term target retirement dates.
329
  
The DOL’s short-term response, coordinated with the SEC, was to issue an investor 
bulletin explaining the risks of investing in TDFs.
330
  The bulletin contained three pages 
of potentially useful information in an easy to read format combining charts and 
questions and answers.
331
   In the longer term, the DOL has been drafting enhanced 
disclosure guidelines that would require plans to provide employees with 401(k) assets 
invested in TDFs more information about those funds.
332
  Ultimately that guidance and 
the required disclosures are likely to include valuable information for the plan sponsors 
and participants that read and understand them. 
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However, addressing issues with default investment products through education 
and disclosure is entirely inconsistent with the principles of a default regime.  Behavior 
economics and choice architecture show that no retirement system can or should rely on 
all individuals in the system acquiring and exercising the expertise required to make 
appropriate investment decisions.  Congress at least implicitly recognized the 
contribution that choice architecture could make to wealth accumulation in the 401(k) 
system when it enacted, through the PPA, incentives for plans to implement automatic 
enrollment. There is nothing in the U.S. system of 401(k) and similar accounts that 
ensures that participants will read investor bulletins, disclosures delivered by their 
employers, or any other investment-related materials, let alone that they will understand 
that material or take action based on it.  Research indicates that many participants do 
none of those things.
333
   
The success of a system of defaults, especially defaults into investment products, 
depends on the existence of appropriate default settings.  It is inconsistent to, on one 
hand, argue that default settings are important because an overwhelming array of research 
shows that individuals are subject to biases, lack interest in becoming investment experts, 
etc. and then, when addressing potential issues with default settings, respond by 
providing information to those same individuals so they can determine whether the 
default settings are appropriate or not.  By definition, the appropriate locus of decision 
making in default settings is not the individual plan participant and disclosures directed to 
those participants are likely to have limited effect.   SHARPs address this by allocating 
fiduciary responsibility to the experts involved in investment decision making and by 
establishing a regime of appropriate regulatory oversight. 
 
 3. Increased Employee Participation in 401(k) Plans 
 
SHARPS can be expected to increase the numbers of employees who participate 
in plans both because more employees, particularly at small employers, would have 
access to 401(k) plans and because employers that sponsor plans will be more likely to 
use automatic enrollment settings in their plans.  More plans in existence will mean that 
more employees have the opportunity to contribute to 401(k) plans.  Increased use of 
automatic enrollment will result in employees participating by default. 
Although some plans had previously adopted automatic enrollment provisions, the 
increased partial protection from fiduciary liability associated with QDIAs that resulted 
from the 2006 enactment of the PPA appears to be responsible for increasing the adoption 
of automatic enrollment.
334
  One survey found that in 2010, 41.8 percent of 401(k) plans 
used automatic enrollment.
 335
   That is an increase over the 38.4 percent rate in 2009 and 
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a dramatic shift from the 17 percent rate in 2005, just prior to enactment of the PPA.
336
  
Obviously, though, adoption of automatic enrollment features has been far from 
universal. 
If the moderate levels of protection against fiduciary liability that PPA provided 
for protection had such a significant effect on employers’ adoption of automatic 
enrollment, it is reasonable to believe that the greater protection of SHARPs would also 
have a positive impact.    This is especially true since any small employer adopting a 
401(k) as a result of the SHARPs incentive for small employers would also be utilizing 
automatic enrollment.  Empirically we know that employee participation in 401(k) plans 
increases dramatically when plans adopt automatic enrollment. 
337
   
 
4. The Benefits of SHARPs  
 
In sum, SHARPs would not achieve the nearly 100 percent coverage that 
Australia has or that would exist under the three proposed reforms discussed in Part V. 
That’s exactly the point; SHARPs are intended to work within the ideology and structure 
of the existing U.S. voluntary system of plan sponsorship.  As an incremental change to 
the 401(k) regulatory framework, legislative implementation of SHARPs should be 
politically possible in the near term.   
SHARPs would appeal to the key decision-makers in the 401(k) debate as 
SHARPs would provide benefits to the three major constituencies associated with 401(k) 
plans. For employers they would provide a total safe harbor from liability associated with 
default investment products.  For employees, the benefits from SHARPs are potentially 
three-fold.  First, given increased protection from fiduciary liability for investment 
selection a greater number of employers, particularly small employers, should be willing 
to sponsor 401(k) plans, providing more employees with access to those plans.
338
 Second, 
employers with 401(k) plans should be more likely to use automatic enrollment settings, 
which data clearly show dramatically increase the rates at which employees contribute to 
401(k) plans.
339
  Third, rather than investing their plan assets in an undiversified manner, 
which tends to result from a series of risk-inducing factors, including a lack of financial 
expertise and interest and a variety of investment biases and errors,
340
 employees who do 
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not wish to be active in managing their retirement accounts will be invested in an 
appropriately diversified retirement product.  The third constituency, a powerful voice in 
any debate over reform, is the product providers.  The financial services industry would 
be free in this system, unlike in the proposals for government-run investment programs 
proposed by Professors Ghilarducci and Schwartz, to innovate and create products that 
would spur wealth creation for workers and efficient capital allocation, subject to 
appropriate regulation and fiduciary obligations to employee-investors.  Nor would 
investment approaches be arbitrarily limited, as in Senator Harkin’s proposal, to 




The creation of long-term wealth for the majority of U.S. employees is dependent 
in large part on the system of private-sector employer-sponsored DC plans, particularly 
401(k) plans.  In the current system, too many gaps exist resulting in too few employees 
having access to 401(k) plans, too few of those who do have access actually contributing 
to the plans and too little investment growth due to factors such as improper 
diversification and high fees.  To address these problems, I propose the creation and 
regulation of a new type of investment product:  Safe Harbor Automated Retirement 
Products (SHARPs).  Behavioral economics research and principles of choice 
architecture provide the theoretical foundation for SHARPs. 
Every day, approximately 10,000 Americans turn 65.
 341
  For many of them, that 
date or some date soon will represent the end of their time as wage earners.  Two-thirds 
of them worry about not having enough money for retirement.
342
  A quarter of workers, 
in one study, admitted to not even opening their 401(k) statement for fear of receiving 
bad news.  Of those who did open their statements, almost three quarters spent less than 
three minutes reviewing them.
343
 
Given the uncertainty of the financial and job markets, the limited availability of 
retirement plans, and the lack of engagement by many employees with their 401(k) 
accounts, a shift in approach is needed.  Tweaks to the system cannot remedy the 
extensive gap.  But, replacement of the 401(k) system with mandates and government-run 
investment vehicles is not ideologically consistent with the U.S. reliance on Social 
Security as the mandatory government-run pension system.     
SHARPs would provide the means to implement a solution that benefits not only 
employees, but also their employers and the financial professionals and investment 
companies that service 401(k) plans.  With modifications to tailor the reform being 
undertaken in Australia to the unique American environment and ideology, we can make 
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significant progress in driving wealth creation, preservation, and growth.  American 
employees work too hard to see their retirements in peril. 
 
 
